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satisfy the obligation as did an employer
under § 6303(a). The court observed that
"[i]n a civil action service of the government's complaint provides the [third-party
lender] with all the notice required .... "
781 F.2d 974 at 981 (3d Cir. 1986).
Jersey Shore, dissatisfied with the court's
ruling, petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. The Court granted the
writ in order to resolve the inter-circuit
conflict. The Court then went on to affirm
the decision of the Third Circuit.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, observed that there are three grounds
for demonstrating a lack of connection between § 6303(a) and § 3505. First, I.R.C.
§ 3505 does not declare that a lender is
"liable for unpaid taxes" which would give
rise to the I.R.C. § 6303(a) notice requirement. Rather, a lender's liability under
§ 3505 only arises if it pays wages directly
to an employee or supplies funds for the
wages with actual notice or knowledge that
the employer is either unable to make
timely payment of the withholding taxes
or has no intention of doing so. The Court
found that a third-party lender is deemed
to have such actual notice or knowledge
from the time- in the exercise of due diligence-the lender would have been aware
that the employer would not or could not
make timely payments. "[A] prudent lender
could be alerted to its liability under section 3505 at the time it engaged in what
the government describes as net payroll
financing .... " ld. at 87,115 (1987). Furthermore, the Court noted that, "[S]ureties
can protect themselves against any losses
attributable to withholding taxes by including this risk ofliability in establishing
their premiums, and lenders by including
the amounts in their loans and taking adequate security." Citing, S. Rep. No. 1708,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1966); H.R.
Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 22
(1966).
Secondly, the Court considered the fact
that employers and lenders are in different
positions. While employers are subject to
the government's summary collection procedures soon after unpaid employment
taxes are assessed, the government may
only forcibly collect against a lender by
filing a civil suit in court. Thus, an employer has a far greater need for an assessment notice than a third-party lender who
is not subject to summary collection procedures.
Lastly, the Court considered the actual
content of the§ 6303(a) notice. Under this
section, the government must not only give
notice to each person liable for unpaid tax
but the notice must contain 1) the amount
assessed and 2) the demand for payment.
The Court pointed out that a third-party
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lender generally will not be concerned with
the amount assessed because it may include
the employer's share of the unpaid Social
Security taxes for which the lender is not
liable. See, H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966). Thus, the notice required under § 6303(a) is likely to
demand payment for an amount different
from that for which the lender is liable.
This ruling by the Supreme Court makes
clear that any lender who engages in net
payroll financing is subject to suit, without
the notice provided under 6303(a), if the
employer fails to pay or deposit the required
withholding taxes and the lender can be
said to have actual notice or knowledge
that the employer is not making timely
withholding taxes.
-Robert R. Tousey

Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates,
Inc.: MARYLAND REFUSES TO
MAKE EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY
EMPLOYEES WHO BECAME
INTOXICATED AT THEIR
OFFICE PARTIES
In Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates,

Inc., No. 711 (Md. App. filed Feb. 9, 1987),
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
affirmed the dismissal from the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, by holding that an employer who allegedly served
alcohol to an employee at a party, who later
crashed his car into an automobile, was not
liable for his employee's actions.
Because the case was dismissed below,
under Maryland Rule 2-322(2), the factual
allegations advanced to Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland were taken directly
from the complaint, averring that Evelyn
Hargis was killed instantly when the vehicle she was driving was struck head-on
on December 23, 1985. Ms. Hargis was
survived by her husband Jesse W. Kuykendall, and a minor daughter, Christina.
The complaint stated that Charles E.
Wilkes, Jr. and Robert Dean Wade, employees of Top Notch Laminates, Inc.
(Top Notch), "were driving their separate
cars while drunk." According to the allegations contained in the complaint, Wilkes
and Wade were "swerving back and forth
on the roadway trying to pass or to prevent
the other from passing." During their
"horse-play", Wilkes "swerved across
the center line at a high rate of speed directly into the path of the car driven by
Ms. Hargis." (slip op. at p. 1).
Immediately prior to this occurrence
both Wilkes and Wade had been attending
a Christmas party hosted by their employer
Top Notch, attendance to which was not

required. (Emphasis supplied). The complaint averred that Wilkes and Wade had
been drinking "constantly from 12:30 p.m.
to 5:00 p.m. and became highly intoxicated." The complaint further indicated
that Top Notch knew of their intoxicated
condition, but continued to serve both men
alcoholic beverages. (Id. slip op. at 2).
From these facts Mr. Kuykendall filed suit
against Top Notch, for himself, as personal
representative of Ms. Hargis' estate, and
for the couple's minor daughter, Christina
(Appellants). The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Top Notch's motion to dismiss, with which this appeal
ensued.
On appeal, the court of special appeals
was presented with the question of whether
the employer could be held accountable
for the actions ofWade and Wilkes, under
traditional theories of negligence. As a preliminary matter, the court reviewed the
elements of a negligence cause of action,
(1) a legal duty, (2) a failure to perform the
duty, (3) damage to the plaintiff, and (4) the
damage occasioned by the defendant's failure to perform the duty. The appellants
first argued that the legal duty owed by
Top Notch was established because of the
"special relationship" established between
employer and employee. The appellants
theory was based upon the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 315, which provides:

"There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another
unless
(a) a special relation exists between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection." (Emphasis
added). !d. slip op. at 6.
The appellants alleged that this relationship "conferred a duty upon Top Notch
(the actor) to control the actions of Wilkes
(the third person), as well as a duty to the
general public to protect them from injury
by Wilkes." (Id. slip op. at 6). This duty,
appellants argued, was then breached when
Top Notch permitted Wilkes and Wade to
drive their own cars, because Top Notch
chose not to prevent the two men from
driving home while intoxicated.
Appellants' second argument was that
the employer failed to exercise reasonable
care to avoid injury to third persons, thereby
relying on Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark,
668 S. W .2d 307 ( 1983). In Otis, the Texas
Supreme Court decided that, "an employer
who knew his employee was incapacitated

because of intoxication but nevertheless
escorted the employee to a motor vehicle
and allowed him to drive away could be
negligent." The Texas Supreme Court allowed the suit because in their view the
employer had "failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to third persons."
(/d. slip op. at 7).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in their opinion initially noticed the
similarity between the appellants' cause of
action and Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,
4 76 A.2d 1219 ( 1984), a case decided by
the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey. After
stating the issue of whether an employer
who negligently "promotes and permits the
intoxication of an employee at the employer's premises during business hours and in
the course of an employer's party, and knowingly allows the intoxicated employee to
drive from his employment and negligently
collide with and kill another" can be held
liable, the court examined the line of cases
preceding the Kelly holding. Kelly stood
for the proposition in New Jersey that a host
at a party could be liable to a third party for
actions of "a person who was drunk and
who subsequently, in a motor vehicle collision, negligently injured the third party."
(/d. slip op. at 3). The court in the case at
bar clearly rejected such an application of
the Kelly holding in Maryland, stating that
Kelly did not suddenly appear, but "was
the end product of a progression of decisions." /d. slip op. at 3. See Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J.
582, 218 A.2d 630 ( 1966); Linn v. Rand,
140 N.J.Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
The court continued that such an adoption
would be "out-of-the-blue", and not warranted because the general progression of
cases preceding the Kelly decision in New
Jersey, are not present in Maryland. Further, Maryland has "not adopted Kelly nor
has it seen fit, either judicially or legislatively, to embrace a dram shop law action."
See Felder v. Butler, 292 17 4, 438 A.2d 494
( 1981 ); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78
A.2d 754 (1951); Fisherv. O'Connor's, Inc.,
53 Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982).
Continuing, the court opined that Fisher
had specifically rejected the New Jersey
decision in Rappaport, 53 Md.App. at
340, and that other jurisdictions shared
the Maryland view.
The court then examined the argument
presented by the appellants regarding the
"special relationship." Although the court
acknowledged that the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078
(1986), and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md.
236, 492 A.2d 1297 ( 1985), had adopted
the principle that there is no liability to a

third person absent a "special relationship"
with a clear right to control, the court in
Kuykendall found that there was "nothing
in the matter sub judice to suggest that Top
Notch had a right to control Wilke's actions after business hours." (/d. slip op.
at 6). In applying settled Maryland case
law, the court found a number of factors
for not imposing liability on the employer,
Top Notch. The court stated that "for an
employer to be vicariously liable for the
acts of an employee, the employee must be
acting within the scope of his or her employment." Dhanraj v. Pepco, 305 Md.
623, 506 A.2d 224 (1986); Watson v.
Grimm, 200 Md. 461,90 A.2d 180 (1951).
First, the court found that the appellants
had not indicated in their complaint that
Wilkes was acting within the scope of his
employment when the collision occurred.
Second, the accident took place off the
business premises, after working hours,
and Wilkes was operating his own vehicle.
Third, the court reasoned since the party
was not mandatory, the party could not
have been furthering a business purpose of
the employer, and therefore the employer
could not be held vicariously liable for the
acts of its employee, Wilkes. /d. slip op.
at 7.
When the court examined the second
argument of the appellants it noted that
Otis apparently followed a California case,
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264
Cal.App. 2d 69, 70 Cal.Rptr. 136 (1968).
The California court found that "affirmative acts" of the employer, and ordering
him to drive home "imposed a duty on the
employer to exercise reasonable care." /d.
slip op. at 8. The Court ofSpecial Appeals
of Maryland then distinguished the Otis
and Brockett cases, by examining Pinkham
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387
(Tex.App. 1985). Pinkham dealt with an
employee at a company cookout. The
court there in holding for Apple Computer, Inc. found that the company did not
take any affirmative acts. Similarly, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
found that Top Notch took no affirmative
act with respect to Wilke's operation of a
motor vehicle. /d. slip op. at 9.
In addition to examining the appellants'
arguments, the court examined the legislative intent in expressly not establishing a
dram shop act. The court stated that the
legislature, not the courts, should create
such an act. The court pointed out that recent annual meetings of the General Assembly had not deemed such an act necessary. One explanation offered by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland was the
illogic of holding an employer liable when
an employee voluntarily becomes intoxicated and then injures a third party while

liquor licensees, those in the business of
dispensing alcoholic beverages, are not
civilly liable to injured third persons. See
Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d
494 (1981); Fisher v. O'Connor's, Inc., 53
Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has declined the opportunity to expand
the law to allow the recovery of damages
from employers under the circumstances
of this case, which might have been called
"The Employers' Dram Shop Law." The
lack of an affirmative act by Top Notch, or
a showing of vicarious liability by the appellants was decided by the court to leave
the question of imposing such liability on
employers in the hands of either the General Assembly or the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in its role as "law giver".
-Robert L. Kline, III

Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Gilbert: ATTORNEY DISBARRED
FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
MATERIAL INFORMATION ON
HIS BAR APPLICATION
In Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Gilbert, 307 Md. 481, 515 A.2d 454
( 1986), Gilbert was disbarred due to his
failure to disclose, what the court considered, material information on his bar
application. The court of appeals rendered
this extreme sanction because of the seriousness of Gilbert's misconduct, which reflected on his fitness to practice law.
The nondisclosed item was Gilbert's
answer to question ten on his 1980 application. Question ten required:
"a complete list of all suits in equity,
actions at law, suits in bankruptcy or
other statutory proceedings, matters
in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and
every other judicial or administrative
proceedings of every nature and kind,
except criminal proceedings to which
I am or have ever been a party. (If
'NONE' so state)."
Gilbert at 457.
The answer given was "NONE". In
reality, Gilbert had filed a civil suit in the
Circuit Court of Baltimore County on June
4, 1970 to recover the benefits of two insurance policies on his wife's life, which he
obtained three months prior to her murder. The problem with the nondisclosure,
which made it material, was that Gilbert
was found in the civil trial to have had a
part in the murder, consequently he was
denied recovery. Specifically, Judge Proctor, who heard the civil trial, commented
in his opinion that "[T]he evidence is overwhelming that Gilbert intentionally caused
the death of his wife in order to reap the
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